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King, Iain, and Whit Mason. Peace at Any Price:
How the World Failed Kosovo. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cor-
nell Univ. Press, 2006. 228pp. $27.95
Iraq’s undiminished insurgency has cast
an unmistakable pall over the U.S. mili-
tary’s nation-building mission, which
until recently seemed a core compe-
tency for the Department of Defense.
Both advocates and critics of America’s
efforts to bring peace, order, and good
government to Baghdad agree that the
aftermath of the Balkan wars of the
1990s offers examples of what was not
done in the wake of Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM’S epic Phase III success in
spring 2003. The idea that extended
U.S. military operations in Bosnia and
Kosovo have resulted in long-term po-
litical successes built on well executed
nation-building is accepted almost
without question. But is it so?
Peace at Any Price poses that difficult
question and provides a richly disturb-
ing series of answers that should be of
interest to anyone concerned with the
ability of Western governments and or-
ganizations to bring stability to failed
states, even with overwhelming military
force at their disposal. The authors,
both veterans of UN nation-building in
Kosovo, dissent from received wisdom
in their survey of Kosovo after more
than five years of NATO protection and
UN largesse.
What King and Mason find in that trou-
bled, unstable, and impoverished Balkan
statelet (which is legally part of Serbia
but under international occupation, now
inching painfully toward independence)
is a witches’ brew of nationalism, cor-
ruption, and criminality that bodes ill
for the future of Kosovo and surround-
ing states. The authors begin with a close
look at the mid-March 2004 mass rioting
that swept through Kosovo, resulting in
hundreds of civilian casualties and large-
scale destruction of property and, above
all, shattering any hope of reconciliation
between Kosovo’s Albanian majority
and dwindling Serb minority. Five years
after launching Operation ALLIED FORCE
to save the Albanians from the Serbs,
NATO troops had to defend the Serbs
from the Albanians, and not always with
much ardor or success.
King and Mason’s account is balanced
and just, sparing no group, least of all
the UN, the European Union, or NATO,
from fair criticism as to how Kosovo
has been governed since mid-1999. This
is not a history text—it leaves out all
but a limited, necessary understanding
of how Kosovo became so troubled by
the end of the 1990s—but rather a de-
tailed telling of how ineffective Western
political and military institutions have
been at transforming Kosovo into any-
thing resembling a law-abiding or self-
sustaining society. The authors spend
considerable time detailing the depths
of interethnic hatreds, from the grand to
the petty, that continue to cripple daily
life in Kosovo, while refusing to spare
Western nongovernmental organizations
from critiques of their naïveté and ineffec-
tiveness in dealing with mutual Albanian-
Serb fear and loathing.
Peace at Any Price ends with a helpful
guide on how the international com-
munity can do better the next time it is
confronted with a Kosovo. King and
Mason’s counsel is wise and well taken,
ranging from how to improve war ter-
mination to ensure a lasting peace, to
how security and the rule of law must
be established before democracy can
take root, and above all to how “bad
habits, “ including local “traditions” of
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banditry, criminality, and interethnic
violence must be altered, by force if
necessary, if Western governments and
organizations expect to make failed,
war-torn states into bona fide members
of the international community.
One only wishes that this little gem of a
book had been published earlier.
JOHN R. SCHINDLER
Naval War College
Loveman, Brian, ed. Addicted to Failure: U.S. Secu-
rity Policy in Latin America and the Andean Region.
New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. 367pp.
$27.95
It does not take exceptional analytical
talent to recognize that U.S. policies in
the Andean region of South America
face severe challenges, especially those
dealing with the war on drugs. Neither
does it take an exceptional historian to
recognize that the United States has all
too often paid insufficient attention to
its regional neighbors and partners.
Finally, it takes no exceptional mastery
of international relations to recognize
that South America is becoming in-
creasingly important to the safety, well-
being, and future prosperity of the
United States. For all these reasons, a
clear explanation of U.S. policies in the
region and evaluation of those policies’
track records and potential future con-
sequences are especially welcome.
To a degree, and despite a somewhat
incendiary title, Addicted to Failure pro-
vides a portion of the needed under-
standing. Its editor asked a rather
impressively credentialed group of ana-
lysts to examine each of the countries in
the Andean region and the role that
U.S. policy has had in shaping those
states’ political futures. These analyses
follow Brian Loveman’s own overview
of U.S. policies in the entire region. A
chapter devoted to the European Union’s
efforts follows a state-by-state review,
and the book concludes with an exami-
nation of a possible preemptive U.S.
intervention in Colombia on the scale
of operations currently being con-
ducted in Iraq.
However, this volume is not a resound-
ing success. Loveman’s introductory
chapter is a case in point. His basic ar-
gument seems to be that U.S. policy,
whether crafted by Republican or Dem-
ocratic presidents, formed during or after
the Cold War, altruistic or operational
in nature, intentional or accidental, has
been consistently wrong. U.S. policy,
Loveman argues, has for decades made
matters worse for Andean states. There
are two problems here. First, Loveman’s
disdain for past and present U.S. actions
actually begins to obstruct and detract
from his central argument. Readers ex-
pecting to find a more academic and
objective analysis may question the ob-
jectivity of the author at the expense of
the merit of his argument. The second
problem is even more serious. Loveman
seeks to prove his contention with offi-
cial U.S. reports and documents, but
the quotations are highly selective and
all too often presented without context.
Indeed, had an equally passionate voice
argued the distaff side of Loveman’s ar-
gument, this would have been a most
interesting volume.
Luckily, the next six chapters are differ-
ent. Authored by well known and re-
spected scholars, they draw a compelling
picture of U.S. policy in the Andean re-
gion. Although all are worthy, Orlando
Perez’s evaluation of U.S.-Venezuelan
policy and Enrique Obando’s analysis
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